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Borgida has questioned the extent to which Wells and Harvey's data indicate that people do not ignore consensus information when making predictions and attributions. This article takes issue with Borgida's summary of parts of our work and with several of his arguments on grounds of precision and completeness. It is also noted that Kahneman and Tversky's analyses of data in their lawyer-engineer study were generally underrepresentative of their subjects' behavior. A replication of Kahneman and Tversky's lawyer-engineer study, using all subjects' data, indicated that subjects did not ignore base-rate information for any of the three target cases described by Kahneman and Tversky. It is concluded that Wells and Harvey's assertion that people do not ignore (though they may not use optimally) consensus information in predictions and attributions is consistent with the attribution and psychology-of-prediction literatures. Wells and Harvey (1977) critically evaluated past research that suggested people do not use consensus information when making predictions and causal attributions. Borgida (1978) takes issue with a subset of Wells and Harvey's conclusions. Below, we address the issues raised by Borgida. In particular, it is argued that (a) Borgida incorrectly states the position of Wells and Harvey concerning the issue of ignoring versus underutilizing consensus information; (b) Borgida incompletely summarizes Wells and Harvey's attribution data; (c) Kahneman and Tversky (1973) statistically controlled for target description informativeness, while Nisbett and Borgida (197S) used no control for target description informativeness; (d) Kahneman and Tversky's presentation of data in their lawyerengineer study tended to underrepresent the majority of their subjects' data; and (e) a replication of Kahneman and Tversky's lawyer-engineer study, using a more appropriate data analysis, suggests a somewhat higher utilization of base-rate information than reported by Kahneman and Tversky.
Ignoring Versus Underutilizing Base Rates When Making Predictions
It is not clear in Borgida's (1978) article what the original issue was between Wells and Harvey (1977) and Nisbett and Borgida (1975) . When Nisbett and Borgida referred to the effects of base-rate information on predictions, they summarized the literature by claiming that people ignore base-rate information. Note, for example, Nisbett and Borgida's summary of Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) data: "These investigators have found that people ignore category base rates in a population when asked to judge the probability that a target member of the population belongs to a given category" (p. 934). Nisbett and Borgida went on to characterize this as a "principle" that can be stated as a "proposition" with "bleak implications for human rationality," to wit, "base rate information concerning categories in a population is ignored in estimating category membership of a sample of the population" (emphasis added, p. 935). Wells and Harvey (1977) , however, said that "although people underutilize base-rate information, they nevertheless do make use of this information" (p. 286). These are the two positions that were clearly taken, and at that time the issue was whether people ignore or simply underutilize base-rate information when making predictions. Borgida (1978) argues that Wells and Harvey's (1977) data, which indicate that peoples' causal attributions are affected by consensus information under certain conditions, are weak. In attempting to support his argument, Borgida argues that in Wells and Harvey's Study 1, only one attribution variable was significantly affected by consensus information. The "only one" attribution variable in Study 1 to which Borgida refers is the only attribution dependent variable that Wells and Harvey made predictions about, namely, the person-versus-situation dependent variable. Indeed, the theoretical relevance of the other dependent variables (trait ratings) had been criticized earlier by Wells and Harvey (p. 280) , and these variables were included to test Wells and Harvey's argument that consensus can affect the person-versus-situation dimension without necessarily affecting any one of a number of traits. In addition, in Study 2, Wells and Harvey demonstrated that traits that are shown to be empirically relevant to the behavior in question are affected by consensus information.
Wells and Harvey's Attribution Data
In Wells and Harvey's Study 2, there were four levels of consensus information: low-consensus information; no consensus information (i.e., no information about consensus); moderate-consensus information; and high-consensus information. In attempting to defend his argument that Wells and Harvey's results were weak, Borgida focuses only on differences between the moderate-consensus-information condition and the condition in which subjects were not given consensus information. This focus does not represent a very complete or precise way of summarizing the effect of an independent variable. We found that of the five relevant attribution measures, four were significantly affected by consensus information, with the means for low, moderate, and high consensus in precisely the predicted order.
These findings were contrary to Nisbett and Borgida's (1975) 
Wells and Harvey's Prediction Data
Borgida is perplexed by the fact that the average subject in Wells and Harvey's moderate-consensus conditions predicted that the average of the three participants' helping response was at Level 2.3 when, in fact, subjects were told that only one participant had helped by Level 2. This apparent anomaly is partly a function of memory processes. To expect subjects to recall the exact distribution of data across the six categories provided earlier (especially when there was no explicit or implied memory set) is unreasonable. The proper comparison to subjects' category prediction data is their category memory data. As Wells and Harvey noted, memory data were collected. In the moderate-consensus conditions, the average subject recalled that .9 of the participants helped by Level 1, and 2.1 of the participants helped by Level 2. Simple mathematics shows that subjects could conceivably have predicted the average of the three participants to have helped by Level 2.0 (i.e., .9 participants at Level 1, 1.2 at Level 2, .9 at Level 3). Prediction data for highconsensus subjects are also largely accounted for by recall data, in that subjects recalled that 2.1 of the participants had helped by Level 3. In addition, it should be remembered that there were IS measures intervening between the recall measure and the prediction measures, thus further enhancing memory distortion for the consensus information. Nevertheless, while we reject the assertion by Borgida (1978) that Kahneman and Tversky's subjects and Wells and Harvey's subjects ignored base-rate information, we agree that subjects underutilized that information in making predictions.
Attribution and Covariation
We cannot agree with Borgida's (1978) conclusion (p. 481) that the chief value of our work lies in its demonstration of the lengths to which one must go to ensure utilization of consensus information for attributions. Our research, as well as that of other investigators (e.g., Hansen & Donoghue, 1977) , shows that under certain theoretically meaningful (not necessarily extreme) conditions, consensus does affect attributions. The sampling information manipulation represented a highly meaningful theoretical condition in our work because of its implication regarding covariation.
While Borgida (1978) correctly states our position regarding what happens when people confront consensus information that conflicts with their expectations (i.e., assume the sample is not representative of people in general), we do not agree that this is incongruent with "what attribution theory demands" (p. 481). The general principle upon which consensus predictions were made in our research is: An effect is attributed to the plausible cause(s) with which it covaries. Consensus is a crude form of covariation information. But in cases where consensus is manipulated incredulously (that is, subjects do not believe that the consensus information is representative of the general population), subjects are free to perceive covariation between consensus and nonrepresentative sampling. Wells and Harvey (1977) demonstrated that when subjects believe that the consensus information is representative of the people in general, consensus has reliable effects on attributions.
We also find it ironic that Borgida would suggest that consensus effects on the personversus-situation measure could be interpreted in terms of experimenter demand (see Borgida 1978, p. 481) . Apparently, Borgida is suggesting that when Wells and Harvey's subjects read the procedure of an experiment that included information as to how the subjects were sampled (versus no such information), the subjects somehow detected the experimenter's hypothesis that the level of consensus information (manipulated between subjects) should imply a particular attribution of causality. This reasoning seems strained, but it also is ironic, since it suggests that people are aware of a relationship between consensus and causal attributions; yet Nisbett and Borgida's original position was that people do not have causal schemata for dealing with these types of abstract information. In other words, even if we were to accept Borgida's demand interpretation, it implies that subjects do have causal schemata relating consensus information to person-situation attributions of causality. Wells and Harvey's (1977) assertion that Kahneman and Tversky, but not Nisbett and Borgida, controlled for the informativeness of target descriptions is challenged by Borgida (1978) . Borgida is correct to point out that some of Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) target descriptions were informative (as were Nisbett and Borgida's) . However, Wells and Harvey should have pointed out that Kahneman and Tversky controlled for target description informativeness statistically. That is, Kahneman and Tversky did not assume that small differences between base-rate conditions per se were a measure of the extent to which subjects ignored the base-rate information. Instead, Kahneman and Tversky used Bayes's rule to set up an equation that should relate the two base-rate conditions. In Kahneman and Tversky's lawyer-engineer study, half of the subjects believed that 5 persons were randomly selected from 70 engineers and 30 lawyers (high engineer). The other half were told that the 5 people were randomly drawn from 30 engineers and 70 lawyers (low engineer). Each subject read a description of each of the 5 persons and was asked to judge the probability that the described person was an engineer (lawyer). Because the descriptions themselves were informative, it is incorrect to assume that subjects should say that there is a .7 probability in the highengineer condition and a .3 probability in the low-engineer condition. Actually, there are an infinite number of outcomes that could conform to the Bayesian model. For example, if a subject estimates the probability of an engineer as 1.0 in the high-engineer condition, that subject should estimate 1.0 in the lowengineer condition. Other examples of obtained values that could relate the two baserate conditions are . 95 and .78, .50 and .15, .20 and .04, .00 and .OO. 1 Note that as the informativeness of target descriptions increases (toward either a lawyer or an engineer), Bayes's rule states that subjects in the two base-rate conditions should converge in their probability estimates. Wells and Harvey's criticism of Nisbett and Borgida's (1975) conclusions was that if Nisbett and Borgida's target descriptions were psychologically informative to their subjects, small differences between base-rate conditions (perhaps too small for statistical detection at p < .05) might be expected. While we have no evidence that Nisbett and Borgida's target descriptions were highly informative, we argue that these descriptions (which included such information as the target person's major in college, physical build and other physical characteristics, place of birth, father's occupation, spare-time activities, academic achievements, test scores on academic ability, fears and anxieties, and interpersonal relationships) provide an ample basis for subjects to pick out what they perceive as meaningful diagnostic information. Under these conditions, we argue that unless there is some form of estimation of the informativeness of the target descriptions, one can hardly conclude that nonsignificant differences between base-rate conditions indicate "subjects' unwillingness to deduce the particular from the general" (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975, p. 939) .
Kahneman and Tversky's Control jor Target Description Informativeness
Because target-case informativeness was not controlled in Nisbett and Borgida's studies, we cannot agree with Nisbett and Borgida's (1975) characterization of people as being "uninfluenceable by certain types of logically compelling information . . ." (p. 942). With proper control over the information that people receive, we believe that people will be shown to be inferior to mathematical models (Wells and Harvey's "underutilization" hypothesis) but not uninfluenceable (Nisbett and Borgida's "ignoring" hypothesis). Wells and Harvey (1977) , like Kahneman and Tversky, also controlled for target-case informativeness. However, unlike Kahneman and Tversky's statistical control, Wells and Harvey controlled for target-case informativeness by making the target cases unambiguously uninformative. Thus, Wells and Harvey could be assured that a test of Nisbett and Borgida's proposition that people ignore baserate information could be rigorously tested. In doing so, Wells and Harvey's data showed that subjects did not ignore base-rate information in making predictions.
Kahneman and Tversky's Data
Wells and Harvey pointed out that Nisbett and Borgida (1975) and Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed's (1976) summary of Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) work are incorrect. Kahneman and Tversky actually found significant effects for base-rate information. We also pointed out in the previous section that Kahneman and Tversky did control for the informativeness of target cases, whereas Nisbett and Borgida did not ensure proper control. We continue to maintain that this is a plausible account of the difference between the significant effects found by Kahneman and. Tversky and the nonsignificant effects found by Nisbett and Borgida.
The true issue is not whether people ignored base-rate information in Kahneman and 1 The general formula that should relate the two base-rate conditions of the lawyer-engineer study is:
where />(E|HE) is the probability estimate of an engineer given the high-engineer base-rate information, and #(E|LE) is the probability of an engineer given the low-engineer base-rate information.
Tversky's lawyer-engineer study; the data clearly indicated that subjects' predictions of category membership were significantly (p < .01) affected by base-rate information. A more refined question is the extent to which subjects utilized the base-rate information when making predictions. In this regard, we call into question Kahneman and Tversky's summary statistics as not being fully representative of their subjects' utilization of baserate information. We address this issue below. Subsequently, we suggest a more appropriate data analysis of Kahneman and Tversky's lawyer-engineer study and provide original data using that analysis.
Median Estimated Probabilities
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) used a between-subjects, repeated-measures design (pp. 241-243) . The between-subjects factor was the base-rate information. Specifically, 86 subjects were told that 5 people were randomly selected from 70 engineers and 30 lawyers (high engineer), while 85 subjects were told that the 5 target persons were randomly selected from 30 engineers and 70 lawyers (low engineer). The repeated-measures factor was a probability estimate, for each of the S target persons, that the person was an engineer (lawyer). The descriptions of the S target persons varied in informativeness. As noted earlier, if a subject in one baserate condition estimated a particular probability for a particular target case, Bayes's rule allows for a prediction of what that same subject should estimate in the other base-rate condition for that target case. There were, no doubt, individual differences in subjects' perceptions of the informativeness of a given target case. Assuming that the two groups of subjects (high engineer and low engineer) are randomly sampled from the same population, it is reasonable to expect that for a given target case, each subject in the high-engineer condition has a counterpart in the low-engineer condition who perceives the informativeness of the target case similarly. Thus, it would be reasonable to rank order the subjects in both conditions on the basis of their estimates (from high estimates to low estimates of the probability of an engineer) and to compare the 85 possible pairings of subjects from the two groups for each target case against the Bayesian prediction.
However, Kahneman and Tversky used only one possible pairing per target case. That pairing represented the median subjects from both groups. There is nothing inappro-. priate about this pairing except that it utilizes only 1/85 of the available data. Indeed, the quartile, decile, and so on represent pairings that are just as informative. By using only one pairing, the potential for spurious results is greatly enhanced. Thus, we argue that Kahneman and Tversky (1973) underutilized their own data in the report of their research.
Mean Estimated Probabilities
Suppose that a replication of the lawyerengineer study were conducted that produced data that perfectly conformed to the Bayesian model and that individual differences between subjects in their perception of target-case informativeness yielded the following hypothetical data: These subjects' data, considered individually, conform perfectly to the Bayesian model. However, if the two groups are averaged, the resultant means (.70 in the high-engineer case and .40 in the low-engineer case) do not conform to the Bayesian model. The reason is that the Bayesian model predicts a curvilinear relation between the two base-rate conditions, but averaging is a linear mathematical combination of data. The problem of using means increases as the variance between subjects' perception of target-case informativeness increases. Kahneman and Tversky's only use of means was an average of the high-engineer condition over all 5 target cases compared to an average of the low-engineer condition over all 5 target cases.
2 The problem with using these means as a comparison to the Bayesian prediction is particularly great, since there exist not only individual differences between subjects but also differences between the target cases. This means that data are placed along highly discrepant points of the curvilinear Bayesian prediction line. Thus, using group means and comparing them to Bayes's rule is statistically unacceptable. Kahneman and Tversky were aware of the problem with using means to compare against the Bayesian prediction, which accounts for their additional use of medians. However, as noted earlier, medians fail to represent the totality of available data in this particular situation.
Replication of the Lawyer-Engineer Study
We began our approach to these statistical problems by replicating the procedures of Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) lawyer-engineer study for the three target descriptions available from their article (pp. 241-243). Subjects were presented with the following:
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality tests to 30 engineers and 70 lawyers, all successful in their respective fields. On the basis of this information, thumbnail descriptions of the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have been written. You will find on your form three descriptions, chosen at random from the 100 available descriptions. For each description, please indicate your probability that the person described is an engineer, on a scale from 0 to 100. The same task has been performed by a panel of experts, who were highly accurate in assigning probabilities to the various descriptions. You will be informed of the extent to which your estimates come close to those of the expert panel. Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles. The probability that Jack is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is %. Dick is a 30-year-old man. He is married with no children. A man of high ability and high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field. He is well liked by his colleagues. The probability that Dick is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is %.
Suppose now that you are given no information whatsoever about an individual chosen at random from the sample. The probability that this man is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is %.
These instructions (low-engineer condition) were given to groups of 18 and 20 subjects. Subjects in two other groups (MS = 18 and 20) were given the same instructions with the numbers 30 and 70 replacing one another, thereby constituting the high-engineer condition. All subjects were presented with the same three target descriptions and asked for their estimates of the probability that the target person was an engineer. We analyzed the data in the following manner: First, each subject's probability estimate (p) was matched with a new score (p) that represented how that subject would have responded if he or she had been in the other baserate condition and acted in a perfectly Bayesian manner. The mean of these new scores (p) for each target case in the high-engineer conditions could then be compared against the obtained mean probability estimate for each target case in the low-engineer conditions. Similarly, the average p for each target case in the low-engineer condition could be compared to the obtained mean probability estimate for each target case in the high-engineer condition. Note that using the mean of the individual Bayesian predictions and comparing it to the obtained means is not equivalent to using the obtained means and comparing those to the Bayesian prediction of a single subject. The former procedure takes into account the fact that the means are linear transformations of a set of data that is hypothesized to be curvilinear in nature while the latter procedure ignores this fact. This analysis of the data is presented in Table 1 . The data in Table 1 are based on 2 Kahneman and Tversky did not intend for this use of means to be compared to any Bayesian prediction. Instead, means were used here to test the overall effect of base rate against the null hypothesis of no utilization. In this regard, Kahneman and Tversky found significant (p < .01) deviation from the noutilization hypothesis. The problem with using means is only present when subjects' predictions are compared against the Bayesian prediction. Note. Estimates are of the probability that the target person is an engineer. 0 Prediction based on data from low-engineer condition. b Prediction based on data from high-engineer condition.
76 subjects per target description, whereas Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) summary statistic for the individual target cases was based on only 2 subjects per target description.
Analyses of the data presented in Table 1 showed that for the null description (no information about the target), the description of Dick, and the description of Jack, the obtained probability estimates for the low-engineer conditions differed significantly from the obtained estimates for the high-engineer conditions, *s(74) = 11.4, 2.95, and 1.91, respectively, ps < .05. By implication, this means that the obtained estimates significantly differed from the values expected of an "ignoring base rates" hypothesis. The null hypothesis for this test was that there were no differences between the means of the baserate conditions. We also calculated t ratios using the predicted differences based on Bayes's rule as the null hypothesis. The results of this analysis showed that subjects' predictions also significantly differed from a "perfect utilization of base rates" hypothesis, *s(74)=3.42, 3.60, and 4.40 for the null case, the description of Jack, and the description of Dick, respectively; all ps < .05.
Thus, we conclude that for the three target descriptions described in Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) lawyer-engineer study, subjects do not ignore the base-rate information; but, on the other hand the subjects do not perfectly utilize the base-rate information. We further suggest that Kahneman and Tversky's data analysis underrepresented the overall behavior of subjects in their fascinating lawyer-engineer study. Wells and Harvey's (1977) position that people utilize (not perfectly or optimally, but significantly) base-rate information in making predictions and attributions is consistent with the available literature. Recently, other research has shown that base-rate information affects actors' labeling of their own dispositions (Hansen & Stonner, in press) as well as actors' overt aggressive behavior (Dyck & Rule, 1978) . We should further note that while Wells & Harvey's underutilization hypothesis is consistent with currently available data, it may be too general. There may be many situations in which baserate information is highly utilized. For example, few would deny that the base rate for traffic jams at various times of the day affects one's expectations (predictions) about what time of day is best for driving to work. In fact, such base rates also affect overt behavior, causing people to awaken, eat breakfast, run errands, and so on at different times of the day. Until a wider research focus on baserate effects is explored, conclusions regarding underutilization must be stated in terms of the limited research operations used.
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Conclusions
